Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Production of steel in electric arc furnaces generates toxic waste. The company, which has had an EPA permit since 1989 to store and treat hazardous waste at its facility near Peoria, developed a new process to stabilize this hazardous residue, or electric arc furnace dust, by converting it into material that is not hazardous. It filed a "delisting" petition for an adjusted standard with the Pollution Control Board, which was granted in 2009, with conditions. Delisting removes a material from regulation as hazardous.The appellate court found that opposition groups had standing, but affirmed the Board on the merits. The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed without reaching the merits. Opponents did not fall within any other statutory category which would permit them to appeal and, therefore, had to show that they were contesting a "rule or regulation," under section 29(a) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, to establish standing. The adjusted standard granted in this case is not, in itself, a rule or regulation. It is an individualized exception to a regulation. It is an adjudicatory determination which is quasi-judicial in nature, unlike a rule or regulation, which is legislative in nature. View "Sierra Club v. IL Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

Termination proceedings began with 2006 charges that children, living with their mother, were neglected. The mother received Social Security benefits, but no effort was made to determine their source or to obtain a release of Social Security information. Later that year, a proceeding to collect child support from the father was initiated in the same prosecutor's office, with a complaint signed by a caseworker in the termination proceeding. In the collection matter, the father's birth date, Social Security number and description were listed The state located the father at a treatment center and obtained consent to a support order using funds from his disability benefits.The father challenged the termination of parental rights for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming that, under the Juvenile Court Act, it was improper to serve him only by publication after attempts at personal service or service by certified mail were unsuccessful. The appellate court upheld the order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that the state’s ability to obtain information in the child support action cast significant doubt on the diligence of inquiry in the termination proceedings and that relying on a computerized database search of a parent's name while ignoring, or not investigating, other potentially useful information, does not constitute a diligent inquiry. View "In re Dar. C. and Das. C., Minors" on Justia Law

Effective with 1982 legislation, a portion of each motorcycle registration fee was deposited in the state treasury to fund a motorcycle safety training program. In 1993, the amount set aside for the program was increased to be the total amount of each fee, and the monies were to be placed in a trust fund outside of the state treasury. Without amending the Act, the legislature began, in 1992, to authorize the transfer of money from the motorcycle fund and other funds into the General Revenue Fund, through budget implementation acts and amendments to the State Finance Act. A nonprofit corporation initiated a class action. Summary judgment was granted for the defense, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no evidence that the cycle fees are private. The court rejected an argument based in trust-law principles, arguing that the trust was irrevocable because no power to revoke the trust was conferred by the legislation that created it. A general assembly cannot control the actions of a subsequent elected body. It has long been recognized that the legislature has the authority to order monies collected in one fund to be transferred to a different fund. View "A.B.A.T.E. of IL, Inc. v. Giannoulias" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, considering a suit by the city to collect taxes from a ticket reseller, requested a determination of whether municipalities may require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets. The Illinois Supreme Court held that state law preempts such a tax. The state has a long history of protecting consumers and has regulated auctioneers for more than 10 years and ticket resales for 20 years; it has regulated scalping in some form since 1923. The statutory scheme, and the debates which produced the Ticket Sale and Resale Act (720 ILCS 375/0.01) evince an intent to allow internet auction listing services to opt out of any obligation regarding local tax collection. The city overstepped its home rule authority. View "City of Chicago v. Stubhub" on Justia Law

After thefts from a school office, a motion activated, wireless, digital camera concealed within a clock radio and a digital video recorder were installed. Over the weekend, the motion sensor triggered the DVR and a recording was made, which was later copied by the police. School officials identified a night watchman on the recording; he admitted to stealing cash from the office, but disagreed about the amount. When the state sought to admit the VHS tape at trial, defendant objected on foundational grounds, arguing that the video skips forward 30 seconds and the state failed to explain why the gap existed. Defense counsel also argued that it had not been shown that the camera was working properly. The trial court overruled the objection and found defendant guilty. The appellate court held that the state failed to establish even the probability that the VHS tape had not been tampered with. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the conviction. The totality of the evidence demonstrated that the state laid a proper foundation for admission of the VHS tape. View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Th 1999 dissolution of marriage reserved the issue of contribution to college expenses for the couple's three children. In 2007 wife petitioned for contribution. Two children had attended Cornell, Wake Forest, and University of Texas; the youngest had been accepted at California Polytechnic. The court determined that husband's share was 75 percent and that he owed $227,260 for past expenses and $46,290 for the coming year. The appellate court held that the court could not order payment of expenses incurred prior to the filing of the petition. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The determination amounted to a modification of the original support determination (750 ILCS 5/510(a)). Under the statute, a retroactive modification is limited to only those installments that date back to the filing date of the petition for modification. The court noted, that in making an equitable allocation of expenses after the petition, the court can consider how pre-petition expenses depleted wife's resources. View "In re Marriage of Petersen" on Justia Law

The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a complaint against an attorney, claiming that he converted third-party funds; failed to hold property of a third person separate from his own; failed to promptly deliver to the third person funds to which the person was entitled; engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation; engaged in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice; and engaged in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. The Hearing Board found that he had converted funds and violated three rules, but found that the Administrator did not prove conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation, and recommended suspension for three months and mandatory attendance at a seminar on professionalism and office management. The Review Board affirmed, but recommended a six-month suspension. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Hearing Board. The attorney, apparently unaware of proper procedures for handling funds, admitted wrongdoing, expressed remorse, and cooperated. He had not been previously disciplined and offered several witnesses who testified to his excellent reputation for honesty. He spends large amounts of time providing pro bono services and made full restitution. View "In re Mulroe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' 1993 Lincoln Town Car was hit while stopped. A pipe wrench in the trunk penetrated the gas tank. The car burst into flames. Husband was killed, wife was severely injured. A jury awarded wife compensatory damages totaling $23.1 million and punitive damages of $15 million and awarded compensatory damages to the estate in excess of $5 million. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The duty analysis in a negligent-product-design case encompasses a risk-utility balancing test. Compliance with industry standards (NHTSA) is a relevant, but not dispositive. Plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence that Ford breached its duty of reasonable care on three negligent-design theories. Balancing foreseeable risks and utility factors, plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that, at the time of manufacture, Ford's conduct was unreasonable or that it had acted unreasonably in failing to warn about the risk of trunk contents puncturing the tank. There was no evidence of a feasible shield that would have prevented this injury. Plaintiffs' fourth theory, premised on a postsale duty to warn, was not cognizable under Illinois law and its voluntary undertakings with respect to law enforcement vehicles did not create a duty to civilian customers. View "Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Following separate convictions, the circuit court of Cook County charged the two defendants $10 each for the Arrestee’s Medical Costs Fund (medical cost assessment), 730 ILCS 125/17. Neither actually received medical services. The appellate court upheld the assessment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed with respect to one defendant and dismissed the other appeal. The plain language of the statute does not indicate the collection of the fee depends upon actual use for defendant's medical care. The statutory scheme requires convicted defendants to contribute to the fund because an arrestee who does use medical services while in custody is required to reimburse the county only to the extent that he or she is reasonably able to pay, leaving the fund to reimburse the county for the balance. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

An inmate, committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), claimed deprivation of his right to equal protection because he was not provided with the option to retain an independent psychiatrist to defend against the proceedings, an option afforded similarly situated individuals subject to commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). The trial court rejected the claim and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that an individual subject to commitment under the SDPA, is not similarly situated to individuals subject to commitment under the SVPA. The SDPA concerns individuals who have been charged with any type of criminal offense and suffer from a mental disorder predisposing them to commit sex crimes. The SVPA is limited to persons with mental disorders who have been convicted of serious and violent sex offenses, and are facing potential release or discharge from state custody but continue to pose a risk to commit additional sex crimes. View "People v. Masterson" on Justia Law