Justia Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a medical malpractice case, alleging failure to diagnose apendicitis, the court gave Civil Jury Instruction 105.01 (2006), which refers to a "reasonably careful," as opposed to a "reasonably well-qualified" (the 2005 instruction) professional. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the jury instruction does not accurately state the law, but affirmed. The 2006 instruction eliminated the distinction between institutional negligence, which can be proven without expert testimony, and professional negligence, which requires expert testimony. The hospital was not prejudiced by the instruction because expert testimony was presented in connection with a vicarious liability claim. The court rejected the hospital's argument that the instruction was confusing and allowed jurors to consider personal knowledge in determining what is reasonable. View "Studt v. Sherman Health Systems" on Justia Law

Based on faxes received in 2002, advertising discount travel, plaintiff filed a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The trial court denied motions to dismiss, but certified questions to the appellate court. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the TCPA forms part of the law enforceable in Illinois courts without the need for the Illinois General Assembly to enact enabling legislation to permit private claims. The appellate court's discussion of the assignability of TCPA claims amounted to an advisory opinion because the amended complaint under discussion alleged that the plaintiff at issue had, itself, received junk faxes from the defendant. The court remanded for consideration of whether the claim is subject to the Illinois two-year limitations period for actions including personal injuries and statutory penalties (735 ILCS 5/13-202) or the four-year limitations period for federal civil actions (28 U.S.C. 1658). View "Italia Foods, Inc. v. Sun Tours, Inc." on Justia Law

Tax valuation objection cases, filed between 2000 and 2005, settled with a 2006 agreed order under which the Cook County treasurer was to refund overpaid taxes with interest. The Property Tax Code interest rate was 5% until December 31, 2005; legislation (35 ILCS 200/23-20) effective January 1, 2006, provides for interest of the lesser of 5% or the Consumer Price Index. The supreme court held: The circuit court retained jurisdiction to award judgment interest after an appeal was filed. Because the treasurer had not appealed the issue of interest on two refunds, the court upheld judgment requiring that interest be paid at 5% from the date the taxes were paid through December 31, 2005 and based on the lower CPI rate from January 1, 2006, forward. The court properly applied the amendment. An objector did not forfeit judgment interest by failing to raise the issue before the trial court. The Property Tax Code controls interest that must be paid until there is a full refund of taxes paid in protest; if interest on the tax refund is not paid in full, judgment interest under the Code of Civil Procedure is allowed on the amount of outstanding interest.

The regional board of school trustees dissolved a school district, partially located in Montgomery County, and annexed it to a district previously located entirely in Sangamon County. About 99.7 percent of the reconstituted district is in Sangamon County and the voters of that county had approved a referendum under the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL)(35 ILCS 200/18â185); the voters in Montgomery County had not. A taxing district subject to PTELL may not ordinarily extend taxes at a rate that exceeds the previous yearâs extension by more than 5%, or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index, whichever is less, without referendum approval. The district, wanting to issue bonds to finance improvements, sought a declaration that PTELL did not apply. Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the supreme court held that the entire district remains subject to the PTELL.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to a murder charge. The trial court imposed a sentence of 33 years and ordered him to pay $200 for DNA testing. The appellate court rejected an argument that the court lacked authority to impose the order because the defendant's DNA was already on file. The supreme court affirmed in all other respects, but reversed the DNA order, holding that 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 authorizes a court to order the taking, analysis, and indexing of a qualifying defendant's DNA only if that DNA is not already in the database.

While the defendant was on probation following conviction for retail theft, police and probation officers searched his residence and found marijuana and cocaine. The trial court denied a motion to suppress, convicted the defendant of unauthorized possession, and sentenced him to two years imprisonment. The appellate court reversed. The supreme court reversed, affirming the conviction. By agreeing, in his probation order, to suspicionless searches and consenting to the use of anything found during such a search as evidence, the defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights.

Plaintiff sought damages based on the death of her 18-year-old son in an automobile accident after allegedly consuming alcoholic beverages at defendants' residence. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court upheld the dismissal of counts IV through VI, but reversed and remanded as to counts I through III, which were based on a theory that defendants voluntarily undertook to prevent underage drinking and negligently performed that duty. The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the case as involving "nonfeasance." Defendants owed no duty to prohibit voluntary possession or consumption of alcohol, and took no action to do so pursuant to their verbalized intent to monitor, which was communicated only to their son.

The plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful-birth and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on medical-provider defendants' failure to inform them that their older child had a genetic mutation. They claim that they would not have conceived a second child if they had been given correct information. The trial court held that damages available in a wrongful-birth action do not include the extraordinary costs of caring for a disabled child after he reaches the age of majority. The appellate court held that plaintiff parents in a wrongful-birth case may recover damages for the cost of caring for their dependent,disabled, adult child and that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, noting a question of fact concerning when the limitations period began to run. The court affirmed the holding that the plaintiffs have a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; the "zone of danger" test does not apply when damages for emotional distress are an element of another tort. The court reversed and reinstated the judgment that plaintiffs may not recover damages for the postmajority expenses of caring for their son; damages incurred after the age of majority are incurred by the child, who suffered no legal harm.

During a traffic stop, a gun was recovered from a latched compartment in the backseat armrest of defendant's car. The defendant was charged with two counts: aggravated unlawful use of a weapon based on carrying an âuncased, loaded and immediately accessibleâ firearm in his vehicle (720 ILCS 5/24â1.6) and based on carrying a firearm in a vehicle âat a time when he was not on his own land or in his own abode or fixed place of businessâ and had ânot been issued a currently valid Firearm Ownerâs Identification Card.â The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. A conviction on the first count cannot be upheld because it is undisputed that the gun was contained in a latched compartment. The trial court also erred in refusing to allow the defendant to produce evidence that he had a valid Indiana FOID card. The court declined to sustain the conviction on a lesser included charge of unlawful use of a weapon because it was not clear from the general verdict that the jury concluded that the gun was loaded and accessible.

Phoenix Insurance Company ("Phoenix") filed a complaint in circuit court rejecting the arbitration award given to appellee when she requested coverage under the underinsured-motorist provisions of her policy with Phoenix after she was injured in a car accident and the other driver's vehicle was underinsured. At issue was whether a provision allowing either party to an insurance contract to demand a trial de novo following arbitration was unenforceable when it appeared in an underinsured-motorist policy. The court held that the provision in appellee's underinsured-motorist policy allowing either party to reject an award over the statutory minimum for liability coverage did not violate public policy and was not unconscionable.